

1 Todd M. Touton  
Nevada Bar No. 1744  
2 Marla DaVee  
Nevada Bar No. 11098  
3 LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS  
1700 Bank of America Plaza  
4 300 South Fourth Street  
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101  
5 (702) 383-8888 (Telephone)  
(702) 383-8845 (Fax)

6 Mark A. Hannemann, *admitted pro hac vice*  
7 Jeffrey S. Ginsberg, *admitted pro hac vice*  
Richard M. Cowell, *admitted pro hac vice*  
8 KENYON & KENYON LLP  
One Broadway  
9 New York, NY 10004  
10 (212) 425-7200 (Telephone)

11 *Attorneys for Robert Bosch LLC*

12 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
13 **DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

14 ROBERT BOSCH LLC,

15 Plaintiff,

16 v.

17 ADM 21 CO., LTD.; ADM USA; and  
18 ADM NORTH AMERICA,

19 Defendants.

Case No. 2:10-cv-01930-RLH-RJJ

20 **PLAINTIFF ROBERT BOSCH LLC'S RESPONSIVE**  
21 **SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF**  
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Plaintiff Robert Bosch LLC (“Bosch”) submits this Supplemental Claim Construction brief in response to defendants ADM21 Co. Ltd. and ADM21 Co. (North America) Ltd. (collectively, “ADM”)’s Opening Claim Construction Brief Regarding The ’926, ’218 and ’988 Patents (D.I. 90 (“ADM Br.”)) and in further support of its Supplemental Opening Claim Construction Brief (D.I. 84 (“Bosch Br.” or “Opening Brief”)) of proposed claim constructions with respect to United States Patent Nos. 6,523,218 (“the ’218 patent”), 6,611,988 (“the ’988 patent”), and 6,836,926 (“the ’926 patent”).<sup>1</sup>

## ARGUMENT

ADM argues that many of the claim terms discussed are indefinite. ADM’s positions lack merit. Indeed, to prove a claim term indefinite, and thus prove the claim invalid, an accused infringer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the claim term is insolubly ambiguous. *See Haemonetics Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.*, 607 F.3d 776, 783 (Fed. Cir. 2010); *Source Search Techs., LLC v. Lending Tree, LLC*, 588 F.3d 1063, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2009). “Thus, [a]n accused infringer must . . . demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that one of ordinary skill in the relevant art could not discern the boundaries of the claim based on the claim language, the specification, the prosecution history, and the knowledge in the relevant art.” *Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co.*, 642 F.3d 1355, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting *Haemonetics Corp.*, 607 F.3d at 783 (alterations in original)). “If the meaning of the claim is discernible, even though the task may be formidable and the conclusion may be one over which reasonable persons will disagree, we have held the claim sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on indefiniteness grounds.” *Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. United States*, 609 F.3d 1292, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

As discussed below, all of the claim terms are readily amenable to construction—indeed, many of the terms are easily understandable and can be applied by the jury without

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<sup>1</sup> Citations to Ex. A–I refer to the exhibits to Bosch’s Supplemental Opening Claim Construction Brief (D.I. 84); citations to Ex. J–M refer to the exhibits submitted with this brief.

construction—and ADM has failed to produce the clear and convincing evidence needed to meet the “exacting standard” required to prove them indefinite.<sup>2</sup>

#### A. Claim Terms From The '218 Patent

##### 1. “the spoiler has a recess receiving at least one retainer”

Claim	Bosch’s Proposed Construction	ADM’s Proposed Construction
1	No construction is necessary.	the spoiler has a recess receiving at least one retainer; the recess is not an aperture or hole, but merely an indentation

ADM argues that the term “recess” must be negatively defined as “not an aperture or hole, but merely an indentation.” ADM’s construction relies on a passage in the specification that states that “it is *possible* for this spoiler to be formed integrally and economically onto the wiper strip” (ADM. Br. at 10 (citing the '218 patent (Ex. A) at 1:37–42 (emphasis added))). In support of its arguments ADM relies on out-of-context portions of the specification and an improper reading of the prosecution history.

ADM first argues that the specification’s description of, and figures depicting, preferred embodiments, justifies limiting “recess” (ADM Br. at 9–10). ADM’s position runs contrary to the case law. *See Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp.*, 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“the language that Harris [the defendant] argues should limit claim 1 is clearly found in the . . . patent’s description of the preferred embodiment. It is precisely against this type of claim construction that our prior case law counsels.”); *see also Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.*, 483 F.3d 800, 807–08 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (rejecting defendant’s proposed construction as “an improper attempt to read a feature of the preferred embodiment into the claims as a limitation”).

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
<sup>2</sup> An accused infringer’s argument that a claim is indefinite does not prevent the court from holding that the term can be applied by the jury without construction. *E.g., Pulse Eng’g, Inc. v. Mascon, Inc.*, No. 08-cv-0595, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26885, at \*12–18 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009) (holding claim terms not indefinite and not requiring construction); *Mondis Tech., Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co.*, No. 2:07-cv-565, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7140, at \*83–84 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2011) (claim term was not indefinite and did not require construction); *W. Union Co. v. Moneygram Int’l, Inc.*, No. A-07-CA-372, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132700, at \*11–12 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2010 (same)).

Moreover, the language from the specification on which ADM relies does not support limiting the definition of recess. For example, ADM does not explain how the fact that the recesses are sometimes described as being “groovelike” requires them to be indentations in the spoiler, (*see* ADM Br. at 9–10 (citing the ’218 patent (Ex. A) at 2:9, 4:61)). In addition, the description of the recesses as “oriented transversely to the length of the wiper strip” similarly does not imply or require that the recesses be indentations (*see id.* (citing the ’218 patent (Ex. A) at 4:10–11)). Indeed, the words “indentation,” “hole” and “aperture” are not found anywhere in the ’218 patent’s specification. And, while the invention does allow for the spoiler to be formed integrally with the wiper strip, claim 1 includes no such limitation. Figure 7, cited by ADM, similarly does not evince any disclaimer of scope. *Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co.*, 400 F.3d 901, 907–08 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting district court’s claim construction because “By its reliance on the figures, the district court improperly limited claim 1 to a preferred embodiment”); *see also MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.*, 474 F.3d 1323, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“patent coverage is not necessarily limited to inventions that look like the ones in the figures. To hold otherwise would be to import limitations onto the claim from the specification, which is fraught with ‘danger.’ Limiting claims from the specification is generally not permitted absent a clear disclosure that the patentee intended the claims to be limited as shown.” (internal citations omitted)).

ADM also cites to an interview summary in the prosecution history of the ’218 patent, in which the German Hoyler reference was discussed, to support its limiting construction (ADM Br. at 11).<sup>3</sup> ADM is misguided. In the summary, the Examiner noted that the recess set forth in claim 1 was not “an aperture or hole *as is shown by Hoyler.*” Ex K, Interview Summary, at BOS\_LLC0812962 (emphasis added). The “aperture or hole” as shown by Hoyler is located in the upper portion of a wiper blade, *i.e.*, it is a void surrounded on all sides by the wiper blade; it is not an aperture or hole in a spoiler. Fig. B-B from Hoyler shows a “retainer,” highlighted in blue, passing through this hole, highlighted in red:

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<sup>3</sup> Ex. J, German Patent DE 1 028 896.



(Ex. J, DE 1 028 896 at Fig. B-B). The Examiner also noted that “the upper portion of the blade of Hoyler *can not fairly be considered to be a spoiler* in the sense of an airfoil employed to decrease lift” (Ex. L, Examiner’s Amendment and Reasons for Allowance, at BOS\_LLC0813070 (emphasis added)). Indeed, the wiper blade described in Hoyler is a conventional bracketed blade, not a flat blade with a spoiler as described and claimed in the ’218 patent.

The Examiner’s statement thus says nothing about the definition of a recess in reference to a spoiler nor does it provide any support for ADM’s construction that the recess is “merely an indentation.” Accordingly, ADM’s construction should be rejected. *See Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc.*, 574 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that an Examiner’s statements that do not bear on a disputed term are irrelevant).

In urging that the Court adopt its construction, ADM discusses the purported differences between its accused products and the claims of the ’218 patent making clear that the motivation behind ADM’s position is to set up a non-infringement defense at trial. Such comparison is impermissible at the claim construction stage. *See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am.*, 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (*en banc*) (“It is only *after* the claims have been *construed without reference to the accused device* that the claims, as so construed, are applied to the accused device to determine infringement.” (emphasis in original)).

Since ADM’s construction would import limitations from preferred embodiments in the specification and figures, and relies on irrelevant sections of the prosecution history, it should be



discarded. As ADM does not dispute that the term is otherwise understandable by the jury without construction, the Court should decline to construe it. *E.g., Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. ATI Techs., Inc.*, 607 F.3d 784, 798 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s choice to not construe term and apply its ordinary meaning); *Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Eng’g, Inc.*, 721 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1004 (D. Nev. 2010) (holding that a claim term should be given its ordinary meaning and did not require construction); *see also U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.*, 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (claim construction “is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy”).

## 2. “a spoiler having an outer profile”

Claim	Bosch’s Proposed Construction	ADM’s Proposed Construction
1	No construction is necessary	a spoiler having an outer surface shaped so as to prevent the wiper blade from lifting away from the window

ADM seeks to define the simple term “profile” as “surface shaped so as to prevent the wiper blade from lifting away from the window” (ADM Br. at 12). The sections of the specification cited by ADM do not support its proposed construction. Column 1, lines 26–29 of the ’218 patent describes the prior art and does not discuss the shape of a spoiler’s outer profile. Similarly, column 1, lines 42–46 does not impose a requirement on the shape of the spoiler’s profile, but merely reiterates claim 1’s requirement that at least one retainer be at least approximately adapted to that shape.

Since ADM’s construction would import limitations from inapplicable sections of the specification, it should be rejected. Moreover, as the term is readily understandable and able to be applied by the jury without construction, the Court should decline to construe this term. *Silicon Graphics*, 607 F.3d at 798; *Halo Elecs.*, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 1004.

## 3. “at least approximately adapted”

Claim	Bosch’s Proposed Construction	ADM’s Proposed Construction
1	No construction is necessary	indefinite

As noted in Bosch’s Opening Brief, (*see* D.I. 84 at 5–6), the term “at least approximately adapted” is clear and can be applied by the jury without construction. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly found approximation language to not be indefinite and, in many cases, has used the word “approximately” as a construction. *See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.*, 395 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that “about” “should be given its ordinary meaning of ‘approximately’”); *Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel Elec., Inc.*, 847 F.2d 819, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the term “closely approximate” was not indefinite). Moreover, it is not necessary for a patentee to “define his invention with mathematical precision in order to comply with the definiteness requirement.” *Oakley, Inc. v. Sunglass Hut Int’l*, 316 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing *In re Marosi*, 710 F.2d 799, 802-03 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). ADM has provided no evidence that one of skill in the art would not understand the meaning of “at least approximately adapted” and thus has failed to prove the term indefinite. Indeed, Bosch’s expert, Dr. Steven Dubowsky, found that the term, read in light of the surrounding claim language and the specification, is easily understandable and requires no construction (Dubowsky Dec. at ¶¶ 5–8)<sup>4</sup>.

ADM argues that the claim term is indefinite because it uses what ADM describes as “three serial terms of approximation” (ADM Br. at 13). ADM’s argument lacks merit. First, “adapted” is not a term of approximation. *E.g., Cent. Admixture Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Adv. Cardiac Solutions, P.C.*, 482 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that phrase “adapted to be diluted” did not possess “any significant ambiguity, much less intractable ambiguity making the claim ‘not amenable to construction,’ which is the requirement to demonstrate indefiniteness” (citation omitted)). The Federal Circuit has held that “Claims using relative terms such as ‘near’ or ‘adapted to’ are insolubly ambiguous only if they provide no guidance to those skilled in the art as to the scope of that requirement.” *Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs.*,

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<sup>4</sup> Citations to “Dubowsky Dec.” refer to the declaration of Dr. Steven Dubowsky, filed contemporaneously herewith.

1 *Inc.*, 599 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010). As noted below, the specification of the '218 patent  
2 provides guidance as to the meaning of the term “adapted” (*e.g.*, Ex. A at 4:18–25).

3 Second, the use of “at least” in this context is not ambiguous. The use of “at least” is to  
4 set a minimum level. *E.g.*, *Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC*, 65 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir.  
5 1995). Obviously, the maximum level of adaptation here would be a retainer that was exactly  
6 adapted to the spoiler’s outer profile.

7 Finally, as noted above, the word “approximately” is not ambiguous. Read in context,  
8 the term simply means what it says, that the retainer is of similar shape to the spoiler. There is  
9 no need for a construction here, as the language of the claim itself is perfectly understandable.  
10 *E.g.*, *Pulse Eng’g, Inc. v. Mascon, Inc.*, No. 08-cv-0595, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26885, at \*12–  
11 18 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009) (holding claim terms not indefinite and not requiring construction);  
12 *Mondis Tech., Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co.*, No. 2:07-cv-565, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS  
13 7140, at \*83–84 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2011) (claim term was not indefinite and did not require  
14 construction); *W. Union Co. v. Moneygram Int’l, Inc.*, No. A-07-CV-372, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS  
15 132700, at \*11–12 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2010) (same).

16 Indeed, the specification makes clear that the retainer is “at least approximately adapted”  
17 to the shape of the spoiler by having a similar cross-section.

18 In the region of the spoiler 23, the **retainers 36-40 have a cross section**  
19 **that substantially coincides with the cross section of the spoiler 23.**  
20 Each retainer is accordingly also provided with a leading-edge throat 44  
21 against which the relative wind 25 blows. **Seen in cross section,**  
**accordingly, each retainer 36-40 has a profile, in the region of the**  
**spoiler, that is at least approximately adapted to the profile of the**  
**spoiler.**

22 (Ex. A at 4:18–25) (emphasis added). The term does not require construction.

23 The cases cited by ADM do not compel a different conclusion. For example, the court in  
24 *Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC*,<sup>5</sup> while originally finding the  
25 claim terms using the language “at least about” to be indefinite, eventually granted  
26 reconsideration and held that the term was not indefinite. *Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v.*

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28 <sup>5</sup> No. 1:cv-09-168, 2011 WL 871479 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2011).

1 *First Quality Baby Prods., LLC*, No. 1:cv-09-1685, 2011 WL 2632352, at \*1-2 (M.D. Pa. July 5,  
 2 2011) (“Thus, we will construe ‘at least about’ found in claims 1, 8, 9, 20, and 41 to mean ‘equal  
 3 to or greater than approximately.’”).<sup>6</sup> In *Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co.*, 927 F.2d 1200,  
 4 1217–18 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the court specifically noted that its indefiniteness holding concerning  
 5 the term “about 160,000” was based on the existence of “close prior art” that had been  
 6 specifically distinguished during prosecution. The court also specifically noted that its holding  
 7 was based on the facts of the case and cautioned “that our holding that the term ‘about’ renders  
 8 indefinite claims 4 and 6 should not be understood as ruling out any and all uses of this term in  
 9 patent claims.” *Id.* at 1218. In *Hamilton Prods., Inc. v. O’Neill*, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1338-41  
 10 (M.D. Fla. 2007), the court’s holding was based on voluminous evidence, including inventor and  
 11 expert testimony, that supported a finding that the limitation at issue, the dimensions of a  
 12 universal seatbelt buckle, were “particularly critical to its validity, because it is undisputed that  
 13 those dimensions are what made it patentable.” In a similar vein, the court in *Synthes (USA) v.*  
 14 *Smith & Nephew, Inc.*, 547 F. Supp. 2d 436 (E.D. Pa. 2008), invalidated claims incorporating the  
 15 term “less than about 2%” because the term was directed to an essential feature of the patented  
 16 invention. *Id.* at 454 (“The ratio of the studs or bone contact area to the area of the plate’s lower  
 17 surface is a crucial aspect of the invention in the ’036 patent, which is directed specifically  
 18 towards a plate that minimizes bone contact. The phrase ‘less than about 2%’ is clearly directed  
 19 at that essential feature, yet it is impossible to tell exactly what constitutes ‘about 2%.’”).

20 ADM has provided no evidence that the term “at least approximately adapted” could not  
 21 be understood by one of skill in the art. Accordingly, the Court should therefore decline to find  
 22 the term “at least approximately adapted” indefinite. *Wellman, Inc.*, 642 F.3d at 1366 (“Thus, an  
 23 accused infringer must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that one of ordinary skill  
 24 in the relevant art could not discern the boundaries of the claim based on the claim language, the  
 25 specification, the prosecution history, and the knowledge in the relevant art.” (quoting

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27 <sup>6</sup> It is also worthy of note that the *Kimberly-Clark* court used “approximately” as a  
 28 construction for “about,” rendering it unlikely that the same court would find “approximately”  
 indefinite, as ADM argues.

*Haemonetics*, 607 F.3d at 783)); *Honeywell*, 609 F.3d at 1301 (“If the meaning of the claim is discernible, even though the task may be formidable and the conclusion may be one over which reasonable persons will disagree, we have held the claim sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on indefiniteness grounds.” (citation omitted)); *Pulse Eng’g*, No. 08-cv-0595, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26885, at \*12–18 (holding claim terms not indefinite and not requiring construction).

#### 4. “recess in the spoiler is groove-shaped”

Claim	Bosch’s Proposed Construction	ADM’s Proposed Construction
6	No construction is necessary	recess in the spoiler is groove-shaped and is not an aperture or hole, but merely an indentation

As noted in Bosch’s Opening Brief (D.I. 84 at 6), ADM agrees that this term is understandable, but repeats its arguments and construction with respect to the word “recess.” As discussed above, ADM’s arguments are without merit and should be rejected (*see* Section A.1, *supra*).

### B. Claim Terms From The ’988 Patent

#### 1. “hinge half”

Claim	Bosch’s Proposed Construction	ADM’s Proposed Construction
1	portion of the coupling part formed by the bearing recess	the one of the two coupling part halves in which the entire bearing recess is formed

ADM’s proposed construction for “hinge half” (i) reads a limitation into claim 1 of the ’988 patent based on an extrinsic dictionary definition for the term “half,” and (ii) includes an additional unsupported limitation that “the entire bearing recess” must be formed therein.

As noted in Bosch’s Opening Brief, there is no discussion in the specification of a second coupling part half or that the bearing recess is required to be entirely within the hinge half (Bosch Br. at 6–7). ADM states that “the ‘hinge half’ is repeatedly referenced throughout the specification as having a hinge axis” (ADM Br. at 15 (citing the ’988 patent (Ex. B) at 1:51–52;

1 4:35–37)). ADM’s citations appear to be incorrect as the words “hinge axis” do not appear in the  
2 cited sections. Nonetheless, ADM’s argument that the “hinge half” includes a “hinge axis”  
3 supports Bosch’s construction, which construes “hinge half” as the portion of the coupling part  
4 formed by the bearing recess.<sup>7</sup> (Bosch Br. at 6–7).

5 ADM’s proposed construction misinterprets the coupling part as having both a hinge half  
6 and an “other half” (ADM Br. at 16). However, hinge half, as used in claim 1 of the ’218 patent  
7 describes half of a hinge, not half of the coupling part as ADM argues. The coupling part  
8 includes a single hinge half, with the other hinge half being embodied on the wiper arm (Ex. B.  
9 at 1:20–23 (describing both the “hinge half” of the coupling part, the term at issue here, and the  
10 separate “hinge half of the wiper arm,” which is not at issue)).

11 In support of its construction, ADM relies on an extrinsic dictionary definition of the  
12 word “half” (ADM Br. at 16). However, ADM’s own definition injects ambiguity as to whether  
13 “half” must mean equal portions or simply portions of an item (*see* D.I. 91 Ex. 7 (defining “half”  
14 as, among other things, “Partial or incomplete,” “Not entirely or sufficiently,” “A part of  
15 something approx. equal to the remainder”)). None of the definitions cited by ADM require two  
16 halves to be on the coupling part. Other dictionaries evince similar definitions at odds with  
17 ADM’s construction (though not Bosch’s). *E.g.*, Ex. M, Webster’s Third New International  
18 Dictionary at 1021 (defining “half” as, among others, “a part of a thing equal approximately  
19 equal to the remainder” or “a sizable portion”). ADM’s construction, which requires two  
20 “halves,” both on the coupling part, is unsupported by the intrinsic evidence and relies on an  
21 ambiguous, extrinsic dictionary definition of “half.” *See Anderson v. Int’l Eng’g & Mfg., Inc.*,  
22 160 F.3d 1345, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“dictionary definitions of ordinary words are rarely  
23 dispositive of their meaning in a technological context. A word describing patented technology  
24 takes its definition from the context in which it was used by the inventor.”).

25  
26  
27 <sup>7</sup> The descriptions of the figures, which do mention “hinge axis,” show such axis generally  
28 being projected from the bearing recess. *E.g.*, Ex. B at Figs. 1, 2, 4 (hinge axis is identified by  
numeral 52); 5:20–22; 6:1.

Further, ADM does not provide any support for its proposed limitation that “the entire bearing recess” must be formed in the hinge half (*see generally* ADM Br. at 15–16). Accordingly, the Court should decline to adopt ADM’s construction and accept Bosch’s construction.

## 2. “considerably shallower”

Claim	Bosch’s Proposed Construction	ADM’s Proposed Construction
1	visibly lower	indefinite


ADM argues that “considerably shallower” is unable to be construed because neither “considerably” nor “shallower”<sup>8</sup> can be understood and because the patent does not define “a ratio of the difference in thickness between the shallower portion and the other portion in the claimed coupling part” (ADM Br. at 17–18). As set forth above, it is not necessary for a patentee to “define his invention with mathematical precision in order to comply with the definiteness requirement.” *Oakley*, 316 F.3d at 1341 (citation omitted). Indeed, ADM provides no evidence that one of skill in the art would be unable to understand the term.

As noted in Bosch’s Opening Brief, the figures of the patent show the difference in thickness between the shallower portion and the rest of the coupling part (Bosch Br. at 7 (citing Ex. B at Fig. 3; 5:12–15)). One of skill in the art would have no trouble discerning that the shallower portion (denoted by reference numeral 50) is visibly lower than the remainder of the coupling part.

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<sup>8</sup> ADM argues, citing no support, that “shallower” is a term of approximation. Of course it is not; shallower simply means “more shallow”; *i.e.*, having less depth.

FIG. 3



ADM provides no support for its argument that “considerably shallower” is indefinite. Instead, it argues, again relying on extrinsic evidence, that a dictionary definition of “considerably” is at odds with Bosch’s proposed construction of “visibly lower” (ADM Br. at 17–18). However, even if the Court were to accept ADM’s argument that “considerably” must mean “large in amount, extent or degree,” Bosch’s construction is still appropriate. As the item being considered is small in size, on the order of between 16–25 mm wide and of a similar order in height (*see* Ex. B at 2:8–10), “visibly” is an appropriate definition for considerably.

ADM has provided no support that the limitation “considerably shallower” is insolubly ambiguous and the Court, to the extent it deems construction necessary, should adopt Bosch’s construction. *See Wellman, Inc.*, 642 F.3d at 1366–68.

**3. “by each of which one cheek region is formed on one of two longitudinal sides (44) of the coupling part”**

Claim	Bosch’s Proposed Construction	ADM’s Proposed Construction
2	each side region is formed on one of two longitudinal sides of the coupling part	indefinite

ADM argues that the phrase “by each of which one cheek region is formed on one of two longitudinal sides (44) of the coupling part” is insolubly ambiguous and incapable of construction (ADM Br. at 18–19). ADM is incorrect—Bosch’s construction provides the clarification that “each side region is formed on one of two longitudinal sides of the coupling



part.” This clarification is apparent from the face of the patent (Ex. B at 4:45–48; Fig. 3) and there is no other plausible meaning for the term (*see also* Bosch Br. at 8). *Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp.*, 405 F.3d 1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reversing summary judgment of invalidity for indefiniteness based on typographical error where “the error was apparent from the face of the patent, and that view is not contradicted by the prosecution history”); *Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States*, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“If the meaning of the claim is discernible, even though the task may be formidable and the conclusion may be one over which reasonable persons will disagree, we have held the claim sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on indefiniteness grounds.”); *Freedom Wireless, Inc. v. Alltel Corp.*, Nos. 2:06cv504, 2:06cv505, 2:07cv151, 2:07cv152, 2008 WL 4647270, at \*13 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2008) (rejecting argument that typographical error rendered claim indefinite); *Shuffle Master, Inc. v. Awada*, No. 2:04-cv-0980, 2007 WL 4166109, at \*10 (D. Nev. Nov. 16, 2007) (construing claim to correct typographical error).

ADM argues that no correction is possible because there are two potential fixes to the language (ADM Br. at 18–19).<sup>9</sup> However, both potential corrections arrive at the same meaning, that each side region is formed on one of two longitudinal sides of the coupling part. Indeed, ADM’s own brief says as much—ADM’s identified corrections lead to, according to ADM, a limitation that reads either “each cheek region is formed on one of two longitudinal sides,” or “one cheek region is formed on one of two longitudinal sides” (ADM Br. at 19). These are, respectively, Bosch’s proposed construction<sup>10</sup> and a construction that is essentially the same.

Moreover, the intrinsic evidence makes it clear that each cheek region is formed on one of the two longitudinal sides (*see* Ex. B at 4:45–48 (“one cheek region is disposed on each of the two long sides of the coupling part”); Figs. 3, 4). ADM ignores this clear statement in the specification.

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<sup>9</sup> According to ADM, one can either “delete ‘by’ and ‘of which’” or “by each of which” (ADM Br. at 19).

<sup>10</sup> The only difference is that “cheek region” is substituted with “side region” per the parties’ agreed-upon construction of “cheek region” (*see* Bosch Br. at 7).

Because Bosch's construction is appropriate and supported by the specification and because ADM has failed to carry its burden to show the claim is indefinite, the Court should adopt Bosch's construction. *See Wellman, Inc.*, 642 F.3d at 1366–68; *Hoffer*, 405 F.3d at 1331; *Shuffle Master*, 2007 WL 4166109 at \*10.

#### 4. “near one end of the coupling part”

Claim	Bosch's Proposed Construction	ADM's Proposed Construction
11	no construction necessary; alternatively, if construction is deemed necessary, “in the vicinity of one end of the coupling part”	close to one longitudinal end of the coupling part and closer to that end than to the other longitudinal end of the coupling part

ADM's proposed construction of the phrase “near one end of the coupling part” improperly reads in a limitation—requiring the bearing recess to be *closer* to one end of the coupling part than the other—from a preferred embodiment described in the specification. ADM Br. at 19–22.<sup>11</sup> *See Comark Commc'ns*, 156 F.3d at 1187 (“the language that Harris [the defendant] argues should limit claim 1 is clearly found in the . . . patent's description of the preferred embodiment. It is precisely against this type of claim construction that our prior case law counsels.”); *see also Acumed*, 483 F.3d at 807–08 (rejecting defendant's proposed construction as “an improper attempt to read a feature of the preferred embodiment into the claims as a limitation”).

The claim language “near one end of the coupling part” does not discuss any relation to another end. ADM first argues that “near” taken by itself must mean, essentially, “nearer” (ADM Br. at 19–20). However, ADM does not identify any support for that position.

The specification language ADM does identify as supporting its position similarly does not require that “near one end” means “closer to that end than to the other longitudinal end”

<sup>11</sup> ADM acknowledges that its motivation for seeking its proposed construction is to read in a limitation in an attempt to set up a non-infringement argument for trial (*see* ADM Br. at 21–22 (describing and showing ADM's accused products)). *SRI Int'l*, 775 F.2d at 1118 (“It is only *after* the claims have been *construed without reference to the accused device* that the claims, as so construed, are applied to the accused device to determine infringement.” (emphasis in original)).

1 (ADM Br. at 20)— the cited passage merely makes clear that there are two ends, at least one of  
2 which is near (Ex. B at 1:26–33).

3 ADM also argues that rejecting its construction would allow any bearing recess to meet  
4 the claim (ADM Br. at 20). ADM is incorrect—the recess is required to be near at least one end  
5 of the coupling part to meet the limitation.

6 The remainder of ADM’s argument relies on the figures, which generally show the  
7 bearing recess closer to one end than the other. However, absent a clear disclaimer, the figures  
8 do not limit the scope of the claims. “Claims of a patent may only be limited to a preferred  
9 embodiment by the express declaration of the patentee, and there is no such declaration here.”  
10 *Playtex Prods., Inc.*, 400 F.3d at 907–08 (rejecting district court’s claim construction because  
11 “By its reliance on the figures, the district court improperly limited claim 1 to a preferred  
12 embodiment”); *see also MBO Labs.*, 474 F.3d at 1333–34 (“patent coverage is not necessarily  
13 limited to inventions that look like the ones in the figures. To hold otherwise would be to import  
14 limitations onto the claim from the specification, which is fraught with ‘danger.’ Limiting claims  
15 from the specification is generally not permitted absent a clear disclosure that the patentee  
16 intended the claims to be limited as shown.” (internal citations omitted)). ADM points to no  
17 disclaimer let alone a clear disclaimer that the patentee intended to limit the claims to the  
18 drawings. ADM’s proposed construction should therefore be rejected.

19 Since the claim term “the bearing bore is disposed in the coupling part near one end  
20 thereof” is easily understandable, it can be applied by the jury without construction. *Silicon*  
21 *Graphics*, 607 F.3d at 798; *Halo Elecs.*, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 1004. Accordingly, no construction  
22 is necessary. Alternatively, Bosch’s construction, “in the vicinity of one end of the coupling  
23 part” appropriately sets forth the meaning of the term based on the intrinsic evidence (*see* Ex. B  
24 at 4:31–33). *See General Mills, Inc. v. Hunt-Wesson, Inc.*, 103 F.3d 978, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1997)  
25 (“To ascertain the meaning of, or construe, patent claims, the intrinsic evidence of record should  
26 be considered first, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the specification, and the  
27 prosecution history.” (citation omitted)).  
28

**C. Claim Terms From The '926 Patent**

- 1. “ $I_{zz}$  is a moment of inertia of a cross sectional profile around a z-axis perpendicular to an *s*-axis, which adapts along with the support element (12), and perpendicular to a y-axis”**

Claim	Bosch’s Proposed Construction	ADM’s Proposed Construction
1	$I_{zz}$ is a moment of inertia of a cross sectional profile around a z-axis perpendicular to an <i>s</i> -axis which adapts along with the support element, and perpendicular to a y-axis	$I_{zz}$ is the moment of inertia of the cross sectional profile around the z-axis, wherein the z-axis is perpendicular to 1) the <i>s</i> -axis, which adapts along with the support element and 2) the y-axis, and wherein the orientation of the z-axis and the orientation of the y-axis are show [sic] in Figure 4 and Figure 5.

ADM argues that the phrase “ $I_{zz}$  is a moment of inertia of a cross sectional profile around a z-axis perpendicular to an [*s*-axis], which adapts along with the support element (12), and perpendicular to a y-axis” limits the moment of inertia,  $I_{zz}$ , to the particular axes shown in the figures (ADM Br. at 4–5).<sup>12</sup> ADM further argues that because the figures only show one configuration, the claims are limited to that understanding of the axes. But the claims do not limit what “a z-axis” and a “y-axis” can be, other than that both must be perpendicular to the *s*-axis. ADM’s attempt to impose this limitation impermissibly imports limitations from the figures. *MBO Labs.*, 474 F.3d at 1333–34 (“patent coverage is not necessarily limited to inventions that look like the ones in the figures. To hold otherwise would be to import limitations onto the claim from the specification, which is fraught with ‘danger.’ Limiting claims from the specification is generally not permitted absent a clear disclosure that the patentee intended the claims to be limited as shown.” (internal citations omitted)).

ADM argues that without its construction, the limitation would be meaningless and, presumably, one would be unable to calculate  $I_{zz}$ . However, the specification teaches exactly how to calculate  $I_{zz}$  for the situation where the support element has a substantially rectangular

<sup>12</sup> The parties agree that “*taxis*” is a typographical error and should read “*s*-axis.” ADM Br. at 4.

cross-section and substantially constant width and thickness—the only configuration covered by claim 1. Specifically,  $I_{zz}$  is calculated by the formula:

$$I_{zz} = \frac{d * b^3}{12}$$

where  $d$  is the thickness of the support element and  $b$  is the width of the support element (Ex. C at 6:58–7:1). Indeed, claim 1 of the '926 patent specifically references the “ $d$ ” and “ $b$ ” elements of the above equation (Ex. C at 10:23–24 (describing the support element’s cross-section as having “a substantially constant width  $b$  and a substantially constant thickness  $d$ ”). One of skill in the art would recognize this equation as the equation for calculating a moment of inertia in the direction of the  $z$ -axis, that is, horizontally to the support element, and would have no need of axis labels (*see* Dubowsky Decl. ¶¶ 9–16).

As ADM’s construction impermissibly imports limitations from the specification and figures, it should be discarded. *Playtex*, 400 F.3d at 907–08 (rejecting district court’s claim construction because “By its reliance on the figures, the district court improperly limited claim 1 to a preferred embodiment”).

## 2. “two individual bars”

Claim	Bosch’s Proposed Construction	ADM’s Proposed Construction
3	no construction necessary; alternatively, if construction is deemed necessary, two bars separated at least in part by a space	two distinct and separate bars

ADM argues that Fig. 5 of the '926 patent supports its overly limiting construction of the phrase “two individual bars (ADM Br. at 7–8). But Fig. 5, as discussed in Bosch’s Opening Brief, shows a cross-section of the support element—there is no support in that figure for ADM’s construction that the two individual bars be “distinct and separate” (Bosch Br. at 11–12). The specification, which states that the individual bars are “divided into two separate spring bars 42 and 44 as shown in Fig. 5” (Ex. C at 7:10–11), also does not support ADM’s attempt to make the bars “distinct.” If anything, it supports Bosch’s construction that the bars be separated at least in

1 part by a space. Similarly, ADM's extrinsic evidence, a dictionary definition of "individual,"  
2 does not imply that the bars be totally distinct.

3 ADM also relies on the extrinsic evidence<sup>13</sup> in the form of deposition testimony of Peter  
4 De Block, the inventor of the '926 patent and a native Dutch speaker, to support its position. But  
5 Mr. De Block was not asked what was meant by "two individual bars" as used in the '926 patent.  
6 Instead, Mr. De Block was shown one of ADM's accused products and asked, without reference  
7 to the patent, if the support element was "a single piece of metal, as opposed to two individual  
8 bars." (D.I. 91 Ex. 8, De Block Tr. 340:15–20). Bosch's counsel objected quite appropriately,  
9 as a), the question was compound (asking both if the element was a single piece of metal, and  
10 whether the element was two individual bars); b) it sought a legal conclusion as to infringement;  
11 and c) it misleadingly did not reference what "two individual bars" meant in the context of the  
12 patent.<sup>14</sup>

13 The remainder of ADM's argument consists of comparing its product to Bosch's (ADM  
14 Br. at 8–9). The structure of either product is irrelevant to claim construction. *Int'l Visual Corp.*  
15 *v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co.*, 991 F.2d 768, 771–72 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (reversing summary judgment  
16 of non-infringement because district court's claim construction was based on patentee's  
17 product); *SRI Int'l*, 775 F.2d at 1118 ("It is only *after* the claims have been *construed without*  
18 *reference to the accused device* that the claims, as so construed, are applied to the accused device  
19 to determine infringement." (emphasis in original)).

20 Because ADM's construction finds no support in the intrinsic evidence and because  
21 ADM's argument relies on irrelevant extrinsic evidence, the Court should decline to construe this  
22 term. *Silicon Graphics*, 607 F.3d at 798; *Halo Elecs.*, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 1004. Alternatively,  
23 the Court should adopt Bosch's construction, which is supported by the specification (*e.g.*, Ex. C  
24 at Fig. 5; 7:10–11), and does not rely on extrinsic evidence. *See General Mills*, 103 F.3d at 981

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25  
26 <sup>13</sup> See *AIA Eng'g Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int'l S/A*, 657 F.3d 1264, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2011)  
(describing "inventor testimony" as "extrinsic evidence").

27 <sup>14</sup> ADM's statement that Mr. De Block agreed that "a design such as ADM's does not use  
28 the *claimed* 'individual two bars,'" (ADM Br. at 9), is misleading. Mr. De Block made no  
reference to the claims of the patent. *See* D.I. 91 Ex. 8.

1 (“To ascertain the meaning of, or construe, patent claims, the intrinsic evidence of record should  
2 be considered first, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the specification, and the  
3 prosecution history.” (citation omitted)).

4  
5 **CONCLUSION**

6 For the reasons set forth above and in Bosch’s Opening Brief, the Court should adopt  
7 Bosch’s proposed constructions where offered and decline to construe the remaining terms.

8  
9  
10 Dated this 16th day of December, 2011.

11 By: /s/ Marla DaVee

12 Todd M. Touton  
13 Nevada Bar No. 1744  
14 Marla DaVee  
15 Nevada Bar No. 11098  
16 LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS  
17 1700 Bank of America Plaza  
18 300 South Fourth Street  
19 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101  
20 (702) 383-8888

21 Mark A. Hannemann  
22 Jeffrey S. Ginsberg  
23 Richard M. Cowell  
24 KENYON & KENYON LLP  
25 One Broadway  
26 New York, NY 10004  
27 (212) 425-7200

28 *Attorneys for Robert Bosch, LLC*

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Lionel Sawyer & Collins, and that on this 16<sup>th</sup> day of December, 2011, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing **PLAINTIFF ROBERT BOSCH LLC'S RESPONSIVE SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF** in the following manner:

(ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(3) and LR 5-4, the above-referenced document was electronically filed and served upon the party listed below through the Court's Case Management and Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) system:

Michael D Rounds  
Watson Rounds, PC  
5371 Kietzke Lane  
Reno, NV 89511

Russell E. Levine  
Craig Leavell  
Bryce Budin  
Matthew Shiels  
Kirkland & Ellis LLP  
300 North LaSalle Street, 26th Floor  
Chicago, IL 60654

/s/ Marla DeVee

LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS